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A B S T R A C T   
Informal real estate markets have developed as a result of deficiencies of formal real estate markets and play a 
crucial role in providing housing to the urban poor. This contribution combines an adaptation of Ostrom's rules 
with property rights theory to study the rules that have developed in the informal real estate, their spatial impact 
and implications of formal-informal interactions in an informal settlement in Nairobi, Kenya. It is argued that 
although the nature of formal and informal property rights regimes is highly similar, conflicts arise when the two 
concur as they are based on different forms of legitimacy: input and output legitimacy. To the formal market, the 
informal market is illegitimate as it infringes on formal property rights and planning regulations, whereas to the 
informal market, the formal market is illegitimate due to its excluding nature. The research opts for further 
research in the discipline of spatial planning in order to gain a better understanding of formal-informal inter-
actions.   
1. Introduction 
Informal settlements are considered to be one of the biggest chal-
lenges of the 21st century, because they are characterized by rapid 
population growth, environmental degradation, high levels of urban 
poverty and inadequate access to basic services, such as water, sanita-
tion and waste collection (Asian Development Bank, 2019; Gulyani & 
Bassett, 2007). Approximately since the turn of the century, academic 
literature has started to acknowledge that informal real estate plays a 
crucial role in providing low-cost shelter to the urban poor (Birch et al., 
2016; Gulyani & Talukdar, 2008; Nkurunziza, 2007). 
There is a growing consensus among scholars that informal settle-
ments are not as chaotic or unorganized as often portrayed (Andersen 
et al., 2015; Cadstedt, 2010; Koster & Nuijten, 2016; Nunbogu et al., 
2018; Roy, 2009). Within slum communities, institutions underpinning 
informal real estate markets have developed. These institutions are 
heavily intertwined with formal processes (Nkurunziza, 2007). 
A new interest in the potential of informal housing comes in a time 
which has witnessed a more general shift in both planning theory and 
practice (Albrechts, 2006; Nunbogu et al., 2018). More scholars are 
now arguing for the importance of understanding cities through an 
institutional lens, which has allowed for more adaptive and incremental 
approaches within urban planning (van Karnenbeek & Janssen-Jansen, 
2018). 
The development of informal real estate markets is often seen as a 
consequence of deficiencies in formal real estate markets (Berner, 2001;  
Birch et al., 2016; Gulyani & Talukdar, 2008; Kombe, 1994;  
Nkurunziza, 2007; Pellissery et al., 2017). Some of the shortcomings are 
a lack of access to formal credit, high transaction costs and an accu-
mulation of regulations (Pellissery et al., 2017). As a result, informal 
processes, which regulate and underpin informal settlements, have 
evolved to “undermine, accommodate, complement and reinforce” formal 
real estate markets (Nkurunziza, 2007, p. 510). According the Cred-
ibility Thesis, the persistence and successes of informal institutions can 
be explained not by its form, but its function and acceptance within a 
community (Ho, 2014, 2016). 
However, there is a lack of literature regarding the rules and norms 
that actors use in governing urban developments. Rules are defined as 
“institutions that guide collective action based on laws, regulations, norms 
and habits” (van Karnenbeek & Janssen-Jansen, 2018, p. 403). A focus 
on rules is relevant because planning processes and outcomes are se-
verely impacted and constrained by both formal and informal rules 
(Cozzolino et al., 2017; Moroni, 2010; North, 1991; Salet, 2018; van 
Karnenbeek & Janssen-Jansen, 2018). Specifically, in the context of 
slum real estate, studying the rules that guide actors in informal real 
estate markets could contribute to a better understanding of how in-
formal and formal markets shape urban development. 
This contribution explores the rules steering processes of informal 
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real estate using an adaptation of Ostrom's rules. Combining these rules 
with property rights theory, the aim of this paper is to analyze how the 
existence of the informal and formal real estate market shapes urban 
development in informal settlements. An empirical case study was 
carried out in the neighborhood Lunga, located in Mukuru slum, 
Nairobi. As is typical for cities in the Global South, about 70% of 
Nairobi's population lives in informal settlements (Nkurunziza, 2007;  
UN-HABITAT, 2006). The Mukuru case study was selected based on two 
selection criteria, namely 1) high economic mobility, which is relevant 
as a large in- and outflow of people ensures the existence of a real estate 
market, and 2) the availability of plot profiles as this data is required for 
the spatial analysis. 
A qualitative study was performed in order to create an in depth 
understanding of the rules of the informal and formal real estate market 
in Nairobi. Through a document analysis the Constitution of Kenya 
2010,1 the Land Registration Act (LRA),2 the Land Act (LA)3 and the 
Physical Planning Act (PPA)4 were analyzed. Besides a document ana-
lysis, primary data was collected through eleven in-depth interviews 
that were conducted in July 2019. Among the interviewees were par-
ticipants from both the formal market, including a quantity surveyor, 
an urban planner and a conveyance lawyer, and the informal market, 
namely five structure owners and two village elders (4 male, 3 female) 
Transcript data and documents were analyzed using qualitative content 
analysis in ATLAS.ti. The initial coding frame was based on the theo-
retical framework and adjusted through an iterative process of three 
subsequent rounds of coding. In addition, a geospatial analysis was 
performed in order to create an understanding of the spatial impact of 
the informal real estate market. 
Three concepts and corresponding parameters of urban develop-
ment were selected and measured in three microplots: one at a busy 
shopping street, one residential area in the center of the neighborhood, 
and one residential area at the edge of the neighborhood. These three 
micro-sites were located on a straight line through the neighborhood to 
ensure representation. Compactness was analyzed using the Ground 
Space Index (GSI) using secondary data (building extraction) from 
OpenStreetMap. Land use was expressed through the entropy index, 
using secondary data from OpenStreetMap and primary data on the 
function of space collected on the ground. The entropy index measures 
land use mix taking into account the relative percentage of land use 
types within an area (Zagorskas, 2016). Lastly, the concept of zoning 
was expressed through plot size, which was calculated using secondary 
data from OpenStreetMap. 
2. Rules, property and the (in)formal city 
The formal–informal dichotomy is a resource for naming, managing, 
governing, producing, and even critiquing contemporary cities. As ar-
gued by Roy (2005), informality shows us the importance of not only 
asking where things belong, but also whom they belong to. Whereas the 
right to property is based on the premise of exclusion, it can be chal-
lenged by those who claim the right not to be excluded (Blomley, 
2014). These claims can be related to the works of Henri Lefebvre 
(1974), a phenomenon that he termed “the right to the city” and 
contrasted with “the right to property”. 
A local regime of lands includes all the rights, the distribution of 
them and the enforcement of these rights (Geuting & Needham, 2012). 
The assignment of property rights over a good excludes the use of 
others and means protection by the state (Buitelaar & Segeren, 2011). 
Property rights theory refers to the ownership of rights over the land, 
rather than the ownership of the land itself. These rights can be sub-
divided into bundles of rights (Cooter & Ulen, 2012; Needham et al., 
2019). A distinction can be made between the assignment and the de-
lineation of property rights. The assignment of property rights often 
refers to the entire bundle of rights, or at least a large part of it. Deli-
neation, on the other hand, refers to the conditions under which a right 
can be exercised (Buitelaar & Segeren, 2011). 
The way in which property rights are assigned and delineated in-
fluence land use. In many countries, state agencies can influence the 
way land is used through regulatory land use planning. The way in 
which rights are created, structured and trafficked also heavily influ-
ences land use (Geuting, 2007; Geuting & Needham, 2012; Needham 
et al., 2019). The assignment and delineation of property rights is en-
forced through private and law respectively (Cooter & Ulen, 2012). 
These instruments of enforcement are key in the functioning of property 
rights regimes. Only when enforced they give local authorities the 
power to achieve desired effects of spatial planning (Needham et al., 
2019). 
2.1. Unpacking institutions 
In the case of informal property markets, there are often no legally 
binding agreements protecting the owner. However, this does not mean 
that informal activities are not regulated by informal agreements or 
rules. These sets of rules are what Ostrom (2005) refers to as institu-
tions. Institutions define and limit the set of choices individuals have in 
their actions. 
Ostrom's Institutional Analysis Development (IAD) framework cen-
ters around an action arena, which is defined as the social space where 
individuals interact, exchange goods and services, and solve issues. By 
this definition, real estate markets can be conceived as an action arena 
(Mooya, 2011). The structure of the action arena is jointly affected by 
three independent variables: the attributes of the community, biophy-
sical conditions and rules that participants use to order their relation-
ship (Ostrom, 2005). In this contribution, the focus of analysis is on one 
of these variables: the rules that govern institutional interactions. 
Rules have been defined by different scholars, but the most widely 
used definition is given Black (1962), as mentioned in Ostrom (2005). 
Black recognized four definitions of rules: they can refer to laws, reg-
ulations, instructions and norms. They are prescriptions concerning 
actions, interactions and outcomes (Ostrom, 2005). Originally, Ostrom's 
framework has been applied to analyze rules within collective action. 
More recently it has also been applied in the domains of planning and 
water management, for instance in the studies by van Karnenbeek and 
Janssen-Jansen (2018) and Smajgl et al. (2009). As planning is a matter 
of collective action, Ostrom's framework is also highly relevant to 
planning theorists and practitioners. 
Ostrom (2005) defined seven types of rules:  
• Boundary rules specify who can play a role, how the decision of who 
is eligible is made and how an individual can leave a role.  
• Position rules describe the different positions held by participants 
and the different kinds of authorities that come with positions.  
• Choice rules define which actors may or may not act and how.  
• Payoff rules specify rewards or sanctions to actions that have been 
taken.  
• Information rules specify what information participants in particular 
roles must (not) communicate other participants.  
• Scope rules define the set of outcome variables that must or must not 
be affected. 
1 Kenya: The Constitution of Kenya [Kenya], 27 August 2010, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4c8508822.html [accessed 30 August 2019]. 
2 The Land Registration Act [Kenya], 2 May 2012, available at: https://www. 
ecolex.org/details/legislation/land-registration-act-2012-cap-300-lex- 
faoc112133/ [accessed 30 August 2019]. 
3 The Land Act [Kenya], 2 May 2012, available at: https://www.ecolex.org/ 
details/legislation/land-act-2012-no-6-of-2012-lex-faoc112131/?q=land+act 
+2012+kenya&type=legislation&xdate_min=&xdate_max= [accessed 30 
August 2019]. 
4 The Physical Planning Act [Kenya], 1996, available at: https://www.ecolex. 
org/details/legislation/physical-planning-act-1996-cap-286-lex-faoc101236/ 
[accessed 30 August 2019]. 
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• Aggregation rules specify who has responsibility for an action. 
Ostrom's work has received some criticism for not paying adequate 
attention to the effect of the larger context on shaping outcomes 
(Clement, 2010) and its loyalty to a single behavioral dogma of or-
thodox economics: self-interest (Blind, 2015). Despite these criticisms, 
Ostrom's work still provides a groundbreaking step towards a theory of 
rules-based socio-economic theories. 
2.2. Bringing rules and property rights together 
The rules of formal real estate markets are clearly described in the 
laws of a country. However, as this research aims to analyze the rules of 
informal real estate markets, where the clarity of such laws is absent, 
there is the necessity to develop a different framework. This contribu-
tion abstracts from both property rights theory and Ostrom's IAD fra-
mework, to develop a framework that can be used to analyze the in-
stitutional arrangements for the structure and functioning of both the 
formal and the informal real estate market. As argued by Mooya (2011), 
abstracting from Ostrom's IAD-framework to study the institutional 
arrangements affecting urban land markets can lead to a better un-
derstanding of “the dynamic, transactional nature of these markets” 
(Mooya, 2011, p. 243). 
As argued before, rights can be exercised through private and public 
law (Needham et al., 2019). Private law describes rules about how 
persons and who can own, use and transfer their rights (Cooter & Ulen, 
2012). This definition of private law brings us back to Ostrom (2005), 
who identified three types of rules that are relevant to this definition of 
private law. When looking at the definition of position, boundary and 
choice rules, it becomes clear that together they form an elementary 
system of property rights. On the other hand, scope rules define the set 
of outcome variables that must or must not be affected as a result of 
actions taken. In the context of land, this is highly similar to public law, 
which defines the kind of spatial order that is desired (Needham et al., 
2019). How rules are enforced influences their impact on land devel-
opment. This is why when looking at the informal real estate market, it 
is important to look at what Ostrom calls payoff rules: the rewards or 
sanctions to actions taken. Based on property rights theory, this con-
tribution assumes these five rules as most important in influencing 
urban development. 
3. Case study: formal and informal real estate markets in Nairobi 
In the following section results of the fieldwork in Nairobi are 
presented. First, the rules of the formal real estate market are described. 
These findings are based on the document analysis as described in the 
introduction. Second, the rules of the informal real estate market are 
presented. These results are based on the interviews with actors from 
the informal real estate market. 
3.1. Property rights and planning in Nairobi 
The Kenyan legal system is based on English common law. Land 
rights are described in the Constitution of Kenya 2010 and the Land 
Registration Act (LRA) 2012. Land use is regulated through the Land 
Act 2012 and the Physical Planning Act (PPA) 1996. 
Housing prices in Nairobi have been increasing consistently over the 
past years. According to the Hass Property Index (2020) property values 
have increased over fourfold since 2000. With a national annual 
housing demand of 250,000 units and a supply of 50,000 units, the 
housing gap in Kenya is estimated at 2 million units (World Bank, 
2017). 
3.1.1. Position, boundary and choice rules 
The most important actors in the formal real estate market are the 
government and owners, whose roles and requirements are described in  
Table 1. 
Article 61(2) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 holds that land in 
Kenya is classified as either public, communal or private land. Public 
land is land that as of date is unalienated government land (art. 62) and 
community land is defined as land registered in the name of a group 
(art.63). 
The focus of this contribution is on private land. Private land is 
defined as any land held by any person under freehold and leasehold 
tenure (Constitution of Kenya 2010, art. 64). The Constitution of Kenya 
2010 and the LRA 2012 grant owners the right to use, control and 
transfer their land, either indefinitely (freehold) or for a period of 
99 years (leasehold), with the right to extend the leasehold after 
99 years. An owner has e.g. the right to construct, to change the use of 
the land, to subdivide the land, and to generate an income from it. 
According to article 24 of the LRA 2012, an owner must register for a 
title deed with the government in order to be recognized as the absolute 
owner of the plot. In conclusion, in the formal real estate market, the 
government has the power to assign bundles of rights to owners. 
Owners of rights can also reassign these rights. 
3.1.2. Scope rules 
Although the ownership of a plot of land comes with certain rights, 
each local authority has the power to prohibit or control the use and 
development of land and buildings according to the physical develop-
ment plans (Constitution of Kenya 2010, art. 66). Change-of-use re-
quests must thus be in line with the nature and trends of the neigh-
borhood (PPA 2012, art. 41). Article 29 of the PPA 2012 also provides 
local authorities with the power to control subdivisions of land, to 
formulate by-laws to regulate zoning, and control the density of de-
velopment. For example, the minimum size of a parcel is 0.05 ha. 
Ground coverage and plot ratio must be in line with the standards set by 
the local authority. The government thus has the right to delineate the 
rights of owners according to the standards set by these scope rules. 
3.1.3. Payoff rules 
The enforcement of the previously defined scope and choice rules 
happens through Kenya's legal and law enforcement systems. Offences 
are punished through fines or imprisonment. As became clear in the 
interviews, enforcement is a challenge to the government authorities. 
Thus, although rules are enforceable in a formal court of law, players in 
the formal market often take informal shortcuts. In the interviews, it 
was also mentioned several times that within the formal market, land 
ownership disputes resulting from false, informal or missing doc-
umentation are common. 
3.2. Rules of informal real estate market 
Lunga is a neighborhood in the larger Mukuru slum which is si-
tuated in the industrial area of Nairobi. Formally, the Lunga is located 
on public land, a riparian buffer between the river and industry. Within 
the neighborhood an informal real estate market has developed, which 
will now be analyzed. 
3.2.1. Position, boundary and choice rules 
The most important actors in the informal real estate market are the 
chief, the village elders and the structure owners. Their roles and re-
quirements to the position are described in Table 2. 
Formally, chiefs are stationed at the communal level as re-
presentatives of the Office of the President. Their duties are to monitor 
and report on the status of local infrastructure and public facilities, to 
ensure local security, and to mediate in local conflicts. Their involve-
ment in the informal real estate market is not part of their jurisdiction. 
Chiefs cooperate with village elders, who are considered to be the 
connection between the chief and Lunga residents. Large slums are 
divided into smaller villages; each village has its own village elder. 
These elders are members of the community and represent the chief 
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when he is not present. 
From the interviews it became clear that land has several coexisting 
meanings to the inhabitants of Lunga. Owning a structure or parcel of 
land allows inhabitants to rent out some of the rooms or start a home- 
based enterprise. Land is thus seen as an asset, a productive of wealth, 
and a commodity. As many inhabitants do not have a stable income, 
owning a structure (opposed to renting) also provides social security. 
Two main types of de facto land holdings were identified, namely 
private and public land. Private land is owned by the structure owners. 
It is known by structure owners that formally they do not own the land. 
However, in the interviews it was stated by a structure owner that “you 
cannot build a structure on someone else's land. Normally it is said that this 
is government land, but I bought everything. So, the land is mine and the 
structure is mine.” (Structure owner 1, interview, July 8, 2019). Some 
structure owners also referred to the law of adverse possession, which is 
premised on the Limitations of Actions Act (art. 13)5 and allows a 
person who has unlawfully occupied another person's land for a con-
tinuous period of at least 12 years to legally apply for registration rights 
over the property. “I take myself as if I own the land, because over 30 years 
nobody has claimed it. And the fact is that according to Kenyan Constitu-
tion, if you stay over 10 years, you become the owner” (Structure owner 4, 
interview, July 10, 2019). 
Besides private land, there is also public land in Lunga. This is (de 
facto) owned by the chief's administration. Examples of public land in 
Lunga include the land along the riverbank, land under electricity lines 
and the public roads. Public land can be allocated to structure owners 
by the chief through “an appreciation”, which refers to a cash payment. 
The height of this appreciation is dependent on personal relations to the 
chief, the individual's importance within the community and the pur-
chasing power of the individual. 
Land can also be accessed through purchase. Although the land 
market in Lunga is an informal one, the process of acquiring a plot of 
land in Lunga is one characterized by official steps that have to be taken 
in order of formalize the transaction. An agreement is composed by the 
village elder, which is signed by the chief and two witnesses to each 
party. These transfer documents play an important role in proving 
ownership. However, it is also extremely important that the community 
sees you as the rightful owner, as the information who owns what is not 
kept in a register, but through collective memory. 
The boundaries of a plot are not indicated on transfer documents or 
in any register, rather they are determined by taking the original space 
between two structures and dividing it by half. However, this process 
becomes more complicated as people extend their structures up until 
their boundaries. As stated in the interviews: “I cannot go to the other side 
and my neighbor cannot go to the other side. Because everyone knows where 
the boundary is.” (Structure owner 2, interview, July 8, 2019). 
Demarcations are thus also remembered through communal knowl-
edge. 
Once a structure owner buys or is allocated a parcel of land, they are 
granted the right to use, control and transfer that land indefinitely. A 
structure owner has the right to use their land and generate an income 
from it, the right to decide how the land should be used, the right to sell 
(part of) the parcel, and to transmit the land to their heirs through 
inheritance. From the interviews, it also became clear that an owner has 
the right to transfer use and control rights to someone else. Rights are 
held indefinitely, but if structure owners leave their parcel of land idle 
or underutilized, they may lose these rights. 
3.2.2. Scope rules 
Rights of structure owners are restricted through scope rules de-
veloped by the office of the chief, village elders, and community 
members themselves. The study revealed that there are no regulations 
with regards to zoning, but controls of the density of development and 
construction are in place. In order to construct a structure or to execute 
repairs permission needs to be given by the chief in exchange for a fee. 
During the construction, a village elder will come to the location to 
ensure no rules are broken. The village elder will look specifically at the 
materials used and whether the original size of the structure is pre-
served. 
Most structures have the same dimensions of six by nine meters. Plot 
sizes can be different due to amalgamation and subdivision rights. 
Table 1 
Boundary, position and choice rules of the formal market.     
Position rules Boundary rules Choice rules  
Government Be a Kenyan citizen; 
Possess an ID or passport; 
Be over 18 years old. 
Allocate land; 
Officiate land transactions; 
Stipulate bylaws regarding construction of structures and the development of land. 
Owners No restrictions on race, gender, education level or ethnicity; 
Be over 18 years old; 
Possess an ID or passport; 
In case of freehold: be a Kenyan citizen. 
Use, control or transfer their land indefinitely (in the case of freehold) or for 99 years (leasehold). 
Table 2 
Boundary and position rules of the informal market.     
Positional rules Boundary rules Choice rules  
Chief Be a Kenyan citizen; 
Minimum of post-secondary education; 
Be over 18 years old. 
Allocation of land; 
Officiate land transactions; and 
Provide bylaws regarding construction of structures and the 
development of land. 
Village elder Be a member of the local community; 
Chosen by community – usually the richest man in the Village. 
Intermediate between structure owners and chief's office; 
Keep record of property owners; 
Witness to land transactions; 
Approve building construction and repairs; and 
Approve subdivisions. 
Structure owner No restrictions on race, gender, education level or ethnicity; 
Must possess an ID or passport; and must have proof of ownership, through purchasing 
contract or communal knowledge. 
Owns a structure/piece of land; 
5 Limitations of Actions Act [Kenya], 1968, available at: https://www.ecolex. 
org/details/legislation/limitation-of-actions-act-cap-22-lex-faoc128809/ [ac-
cessed 10 July 2020]. 
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When a structure owner decides to sell only part of their plot, there 
needs to be a small space between the rooms of one owner, and the 
rooms of another owner: “It should be separated immediately if you sell 
only part. That is a rule. You have to separate to remove the conflicts be-
tween the two.” (Village elder 2, interview, July 10, 2019). This process 
is illustrated in Fig. 1 (r). The space between two structures is often 
shared between two neighbors. A structure owner can extent their 
house up to the boundary of their plot, under the condition that a new 
access corridor is now created elsewhere on the plot (see Fig. 1 (l)). 
As discussed before, the chief has the power to allocate public land 
to private owners. However, there are a few areas where village elders 
do not allow further development. These areas are often too dangerous 
to live in, for instance near the flood-prone river. Instead, these areas 
are used for leisure purposes. An informal bylaw prohibiting the con-
struction of structures on the public access paths was also issued by the 
chief's office. 
3.2.3. Payoff rules 
Transactions of property within the informal real estate market are 
not enforced through a legal system. However, measures have been 
developed within the community to ensure that rules are adhered to. 
Within Lunga, property rights and land policies are enforced through 
informal political and communal systems. The village elders play an 
important role in gathering and sharing information of who owns what 
and to settle disputes with regards to property. Both the chief and the 
village elder earn money through the real estate market, giving them an 
important incentive to guard informal property rights. 
In the interviews it was stated that when property rights are vio-
lated, the chief and the village elder have the power to take away 
someone's property. Furthermore, as most people know who owns 
what, falsely claiming ownership to a property can lead to rejection 
from the community. This leads to a high sense of tenure security 
within the community: “It is impossible for someone else to claim my 
structure, but just in case, the village elder is here, the chief is here, and all 
those parties are aware.” (Structure owner 2, interview, July 8, 2019). 
Falsely claiming ownership is thus severely limited through communal 
systems and through more formal punishments. 
Scope rules are enforced through a combination of enforcement 
measures from the chief and village elders, and through social pressure 
from the community. Whenever repairs or new construction take place 
for which permission was not given, the chief and village elder have the 
power to halt the construction or demolish the structure. The exercise 
of scope rules is also influenced by neighborly control. These two sys-
tems of social pressure and more formalized enforcement mechanisms 
support and strengthen each other. 
3.3. Spatial impact 
The three microplots and the different land uses can be found in  
Fig. 2. Microplot 1 is characterized by a high diversity of land uses. 
Many shops are concentrated along the public roads. Both microplot 2 
and 3 are characterized by mainly residential use. Microplot 3 is also 
characterized by its large space available for leisure. This space func-
tions as a playground for children as well as a flood management area. 
In Table 3 the characteristics of urban development in Lunga are 
summarized. These characteristics are influenced through several rules 
as identified previously. 
3.3.1. Land use 
As structure owners have the right to use their land as they wish, 
diversity in land use is high. Furthermore, there are the rules about the 
need to leave open space. Whereas the intent of this rule is to create 
safer living conditions, one of the (perhaps unintended) outcomes of 
this rule is the creation of open spaces used for leisure and infra-
structural purposes. These rules combined make for a high entropy 
index within all three microplots. 
3.3.2. Compactness 
The relatively high compactness is caused by several rules. First, the 
rules regarding the construction of structures on the boundaries of plots 
directly increase compactness. Second, the chief may allocate open 
space in exchange for a premium. This provides an incentive to allocate 
as many plots as possible, which then leads to a higher compactness. 
There are also rules in place limiting compactness. For instance, 
structure owners must leave a small space on their plot for an access 
path and are not allowed to extend their plot unto the public roads. 
3.3.3. Size of plots 
Size of plots is determined by the standard size of a plot of 54 m2, or 
six rooms of 3 × 3 meters. Variation in this size can be explained by the 
fact that owners have the right to subdivide or amalgamate their plot. 
Furthermore, it was indicated in the interviews that since there is little 
space left in Lunga, smaller plots have been allocated more recently. 
Urban development in Luna is thus characterized by a high diversity 
of land use, a high level of compactness of buildings and relatively 
small, yet varying sizes of plots. The results suggest that these urban 
development characteristics are influenced through scope rules which 
often have a direct spatial character, but also through choice rules, 
which have an indirect effect on spatial characteristics. 
4. The formal-informal dichotomy: a story of legitimacy 
The results show that both the informal and the formal market have 
developed their own set of rules. The rules of the formal real estate 
market are well-defined in the various legal documents analyzed. These 
rules are enforceable in a formal court of law. 
Property rights in Lunga mimic those of the formal system. Just as in 
the formal real estate market, rights can be assigned and reassigned. 
However, ownership is not enforced through the legal system. Rather, it 
is enforced through informal political and communal systems. These 
systems allow for information to be shared, disputes to be settled, and 
access to land to be negotiated. 
Although in this contribution the real estate market in Lunga is 
referred to as informal, many of the rules that have been put into place 
Fig. 1. Position of structure on the plot (l) and the process of subdivision (r).  
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are actually quite formal and secure in their context. People take the 
decision to invest in property based on confidence in the informal 
property rights system. Through informal practices, invisible bound-
aries are created (Yang, 2018), protecting the property of structure 
owners and controlling the behavior of community members. These 
findings are line with those of other authors arguing that slum-dwellers 
often enjoy high levels of de facto tenure security (Aristizabal & Gómez, 
2004; De Souza, 2001; Gilbert, 2002; Nakamura, 2016; Reerink & van 
Gelder, 2010). This property rights system is highly similar in nature to 
the formal property rights regime: in both the formal and the informal 
market, the government or chief may allocate a plot of land to a 
potential owner. Title deeds must be officialized by this actor for the 
structure owner to be recognized as an absolute owner. Owners have 
the right to use, own and control their plot of land. 
In this research, rules shaping urban development were bundled 
under the name informal real estate markets, rather than urban plan-
ning. However, several scope rules were identified which have more of 
a planning nature, given their impact on the outcomes of urban de-
velopment. These rules show a more publicly accountable character and 
were involved with political choice rather than market transactions. As 
argued by Ratcliffe and Stubbs (1996), this is a clear of planning op-
posed to a real estate market. However, as these rules are established 
and enforced outside of the public sector (the Kenyan government), it is 
more appropriate to refer to them as planning through real estate 
markets. These scope rules thus form an elementary planning system, 
similar in nature to the formal planning system, regulating the con-
struction, location and size of plots. 
The findings show that there are two main channels through which 
rules of the informal real estate market affect urban development of 
informal settlements:  
1. The property rights regime – existing out of position, boundary and 
choice rules which determine the way the property rights market 
works, and thus indirectly influence urban development; and 
Fig. 2. Microplots and land use.  
Table 3 
Urban development characteristics in Lunga.      
Concept Index Result Interpretation  
Land use Entropy index 0.80 High diversity of land use 
Compactness Ground space 
index 
68% High level of compactness of 
buildings 
Zoning Average plot 
size 
42 m2 Relatively small structures/ 
plots  
Range of plot 
sizes 
6 m2–195 m2 Large range of plot sizes 
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2. Planning through real estate processes – existing out of scope rules 
which shape the outcome of urban development by placing re-
strictions on the bundle of rights of structure owners. 
These two channels are in line with the findings of other authors 
who have studied the effect of formal property rights regimes such as  
Geuting (2007), Geuting and Needham (2012) and Needham et al. 
(2019). 
Due to the likeliness in nature of the two markets, and the similarity 
of the two channels through which the formal market shapes urban 
development, one might assume that the concurrence of the formal and 
informal market should not lead to any issues in urban development. 
However, there are many differences between them. In the informal 
market, communal systems are important in the recognition of own-
ership and the enforcement of rules. Although the nature of scope rules 
is similar, the rules in the informal market have been adjusted to fit the 
context of informal settlements: the requirements to plot sizes, con-
struction, and the location and function of plots are vastly different 
from the formal real estate market. 
As a result, the existence of formal and informal markets brings 
along many challenges. Informal rights are highly secure within the 
community itself and are even legitimized by informal landowners 
based on formal regulations on adverse possession. Despite this, they 
are rarely recognized by actors in the formal real estate market. As 
stated by Berner (2001, p. 295): “If illegal settlements are merely seen as a 
violation of private or public property rights, then the forceful and, if ne-
cessary, violent restoration of these rights is the obvious solution.” In those 
cases that informal property rights are recognized, formal titling, an 
approach applauded by authors such as De Soto (2001), in the informal 
market often makes slum housing too expensive to the majority of the 
urban poor (Berner, 2001; Desai & Loftus, 2013; Gilbert, 2002; Gulyani 
& Bassett, 2007; Payne et al., 2009). As a result, the implementation of 
formal property rights or land regulations in informal settlements often 
leads to dispossession of the urban poor. 
These challenges have been well-documented and are related to the 
core issue of the existence of formal and informal markets: the different 
types of legitimacy of both markets. Schmidt (2013) and Needham et al. 
(2019) argue that there are three forms of legitimacy, namely input, 
throughput and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy is derived from the 
agency that takes the action, and thus refers to the quality of the re-
presentation of public interests in the agent taking the action. 
Throughput legitimacy is derived from the process used to take an ac-
tion, and thus refers to the quality of the decision-making process. 
Lastly, output legitimacy is derived from the results that are achieved, 
thus when most people support the results of a certain action. 
The formal real estate market and land regulations as imposed by 
the Kenyan government are mostly characterized by input legitimacy: 
they are considered legitimate because they are imposed by an elected 
government, which represents and is accountable to the people of 
Kenya. On the other hand, the informal market is characterized by 
output legitimacy. The rules in place are there because they are prag-
matic. Without these rules informal settlements would become chaotic 
and unlivable places. 
Conflicts between the two markets arise as neither of them regards 
the other as fully legitimate. Although the markets are highly similar in 
nature, the informal market is not recognized by the formal market. 
According to the formal system, the informal market is illegitimate 
because it was not delegated power via the elected government. On the 
other hand, actors within informal real estate see the formal system as 
illegitimate as it does not provide them with affordable housing. 
This issue of legitimacy relates to Henri Lefebvre's right to the city 
versus the right to property (Lefebvre, 1991). Inhabitants of informal 
settlements claim their right to the city through the informal real estate 
market. However, informal property rights are seen as illegitimate by 
formal actors because of their illegality, defying the right to property of 
those who formally own the land informal settlements are located on. 
5. Conclusion 
Informal real estate markets play an important role in providing 
housing to the urban poor. In the introduction it was argued that in-
formal real estate markets are not as chaotic as often portrayed 
(Andersen et al., 2015; Cadstedt, 2010; Koster & Nuijten, 2016;  
Nunbogu et al., 2018; Roy, 2009). This research has demonstrated that 
this is indeed the case: informal real estate markets are underpinned by 
many rules. Moreover, these rules are similar in nature to formal real 
estate markets. Just like the formal real estate market, informal markets 
are characterized by a property right regime and a (albeit elementary) 
planning system. 
Although the informal and formal markets are similar in nature, the 
informal market has been adapted to fit the context of informal set-
tlements. As a result, the urban poor are able to bypass the deficiencies 
of the formal real estate market, such as a lack of access to formal credit 
and an accumulation of regulations (Pellissery et al., 2017) and claim 
their right to the city, through these informal markets. 
This case has shown the importance of embedding informal struc-
tures in research on urban development. In the context of informal 
settlements these rules are not formalized, nevertheless they guide 
collective action. Studying these rules is crucial in creating a better 
understanding on how the interaction of formal and informal real estate 
markets is impacting urban development. 
This paper allows for further analysis of informal property rights 
regimes in relation to formal regimes. Two main directions of research 
can be recommended, focusing on both the empirical and the theore-
tical. 
First, this research used a case study approach to create a better 
understanding of informal real estate. This phenomenon is not limited 
to one informal settlement in Nairobi. Further studies should focus 
more elaborately on the interface of the formal and informal market. 
For instance, studying the effects of formal slum upgrading schemes on 
informal land markets could provide more insights into how informal 
and formal markets affect and shape each other. The coexistence of 
formal and informal institutions in different contexts where markets are 
for instance more formalized, in a different stage of development or 
manage entirely different resources, e.g. flood, infrastructure and green 
space management would also be interesting for further studies. 
Researching the coexistence of formal and informal institutions in dif-
ferent contexts will allow for the development of a more solid theory on 
the relationship between informality, formality and legitimacy. Second, 
further theoretical investigations of the conflict between different forms 
of legitimacy of formal and informal institutions are necessary to create 
a better understanding of formal-informal interactions. Here, the con-
nection between the right to the city and informality can also be further 
explored. Incorporating these two angles will allow for a better un-
derstanding of the coexistence of multiple property rights regimes. 
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